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ABSTRACT
Effects of Intentional Electromagnetic Interference on
Analog to Digital Converter Measurements of Sensor
Outputs and General Purpose Input Output Pins
by
David A. Ware, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2017

Major Professor: Ryan Gerdes, Ph.D.
Department: Electrical and Computer Engineering
The use of sensors in embedded systems has grown dramatically in recent years. These
sensors are used to increase the safety and efficiency of many electrical systems. With the
increased use of automation and plans for the development of the internet of things, smart
cities and other similar undertakings, the use of these sensors will continue to grow. This
growth will ideally lead to greater connectivity, accessibility of information, efficiency, and
security.
However, the use of these sensors creates a potential vulnerability to attacks that use
intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI). While high power IEMI attacks, on the
order of kilowatts, have been studied extensively, low power IEMI attacks, on the order of
watts, haven’t received much attention. Recent research on low power IEMI attacks has
shown that systems using sensors operating in the range of a few millivolts are vulnerable to
these attacks. This work examines low power IEMI attacks against systems using sensors
that operate in the range of volts and digital logic. This work also attempts to identify
circuit attributes that make systems more vulnerable to low power IEMI attacks.
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The experimental results of this research indicate that IEMI attacks against embedded
systems using sensors operating on the order of volts and digital logic are possible, but will
require more power and, potentially, better antennas to be successful. These experiments
also identified several circuit elements that can significantly affect the performance of low
power IEMI attacks.
(64 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
Effects of Intentional Electromagnetic Interference on
Analog to Digital Converter Measurements of Sensor
Outputs and General Purpose Input Output Pins
David A. Ware
As technology becomes more prevalent, its application to safety and security in critical
systems continues to increase. This leads to an increased dependence on sensors to provide
an accurate view of the environment surrounding an application. These sensors can also
be exploited by a malicious individual to attack a system and compromise its safety or
security. These attacks change the reported value of a sensor so that it doesn’t reflect the
real situation. The systems in a car can be used as an example of this. Cars can have
numerous sensors that measure a variety of things, including the car’s distance from an
object, if the tires are locking up, or if the gas is low. The use of these sensors makes
cars safer and more convenient to use. Using IEMI, an attacker could compromise some of
these systems by changing the reported value so that an object appears further away than
it actually is or that the tires aren’t locking up when they are, possibly causing the car to
crash. By doing this, a malicious individual could compromise the safety or security of a
car.
This work attempts to understand what would be required for a malicious individual to
conduct such an attack, thereby allowing for the identification of systems that are vulnerable
to such attacks. This understanding would also provide the basis for designing defenses
against these attacks, thereby increasing the safety of society at large.
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EME

Electromagnetic Emissions

EMI

Electromagnetic Interference
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High-Power Microwave

IEMI

Intentional Electromagnetic Interference
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High Power Intentional Electromagnetic Interference

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Background
Sensors are critical components in embedded systems that allow the system to acquire

information about the analog world. A few examples of systems that use sensors include
cars, digital cameras, phones, and medical equipment. In cars, these sensors make anti-lock
braking systems, vehicle detection, automated cruise control, and other features possible.
These features increase the safety and usability of cars. The use of sensors to improve the
safety and security of systems is only going to increase and has a positive effect on society,
e.g., pacemakers help prevent cardiac arrest, anti-lock brakes help cars stop quickly, and
fire alarms allow for the timely evacuation of burning buildings. They can also increase the
efficiency of a system - for example, dryers turn off when clothes are dry, lights turn on
and off automatically and stoplights change colors when they sense that cars are waiting
in only one direction. However, all of these benefits come with a price. They allow for the
possibility that a malicious individual could attack the system by altering sensor readings.
If these attacks are not prevented or guarded against, they could easily result in property
damage or loss of life [1]. These attacks, among others, are often referred to as cyber attacks,
and protecting against them is part of cyber security.
The importance of cyber security is widely recognized and many books and articles
have been written to help designers identify security flaws and protect against cyber attacks [2–4]. Several cyber attacks that have been identified and researched include buffer
overflows, hardware trojans, side channel analysis, and man-in-the-middle attacks. When
these attacks are used against embedded systems, most of them attempt to change sensor
data after the measurements have been taken, if they target sensor data at all. Incidentally,
most embedded systems implicitly trust their sensor readings and secure them after they
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are taken. This makes them vulnerable to attacks that target the sensor output directly.
One way that the sensor output can be directly corrupted is through the presence of electromagnetic interference (EMI) which induces a voltage and current in the affected system.
Attacks that use EMI to alter a measurement or damage a system are called intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) attacks. IEMI attacks bypass common security methods,
potentially giving an attacker the ability to control the sensor readings [5].

1.2

Thesis Goals
Microcontrollers often use analog to digital converters (ADCs) or general purpose in-

put/output pins (GPIOs) to interface with sensors. This work focuses on understanding
the susceptibility of these microcontroller inputs to IEMI attacks. Applications that use
microcontrollers or similar hardware to interface with sensors are extremely common and
only continue to increase in number. Unfortunately, while the robustness of sensor output
from a system’s perspective has been researched extensively; research on the vulnerability
of sensor measurements to IEMI attacks is scarce [6]. This work focuses on IEMI attacks
against microcontrollers measuring sensors and expands existing work by:
• Examining a first-order circuit model of IEMI attacks.
• Evaluating the effects of various circuit elements on IEMI attacks.
• Testing the possibility of low power IEMI attacks against analog sensors operating in
the range of volts.
• Testing the possibility of low power IEMI attacks against digital logic.
By examining a first-order circuit model of an IEMI attack, this work hopes to identify
potentially important circuit elements. Identifying these elements will help increase the
understanding of what makes a system vulnerable to IEMI attacks. The effects of these
elements will then be evaluated by conducting IEMI attacks against a system and systematically varying these elements. This will allow for a better understanding of which circuit
elements have the greatest effect on the performance of IEMI attacks. Experiments will

3
then be done using the worst-case scenario for an attacker, to evaluate the vulnerability
of microcontrollers or other hardware, using analog sensors operating in the range of volts
or digital logic, to IEMI attacks. To the knowledge of the authors, IEMI attacks targeting
these applications have not been examined.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
This chapter presents previous research that has been done on this topic directly or is
related to it. Sources are grouped by the type and intent of the attack that they researched.

2.1

High Power IEMI Attacks
Currently, a substantial body of work exists on the effects of high power EMI or high

power IEMI (HPIEMI), as it will be called here [7–9]. However, most of this work is not
directly comparable to this research since kilowatts of power were used and the intended
effect of the IEMI was different. Much of the research on the use of HPIEMI focuses on
the destruction or disruption of electric systems instead of influencing a measurement. The
most applicable work we found was written by Mats G. Backstrom and Karl Gunnar Lovstrand, who summarize work that was done by various military groups using HPIEMI to
disrupt or destroy electronic systems [8]. This research focused on attacks that were high
power and high frequency and described front- and back-door coupling. Front-door coupling has two orders. The first order is when the frequency of the EM radiation coincides
with the operating frequency of the electronic system under attack [8]. The second order
of front-door coupling is when the frequency of the EM radiation doesn’t coincide with the
operating frequency of the equipment [8]. Back-door coupling happens when the coupling
takes place through shielding, intentional or unintentional, or through things that could
easily be shielded, such as connecting wires [8]. Using high power antennas and generators,
multiple electrical systems were successfully destroyed or disrupted. Backstrom and Lovstrand observed that each attack was dependent on frequency and angle. They concluded
that this method could be used up to a kilometer away but requires careful pre-analysis of
the system. In summary, the research done on HPIEMI attacks focuses on the destruction
or disruption of electric systems.
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2.2

Modifying Sensor Readings
Despite extensive searching, only a few papers were found that examined the use of

IEMI to attack sensor outputs or readings directly [5, 10–14]. The oldest paper that was
found on the subject was written by J. Delsing et al. in 2006 and examined the effects of
IEMI on sensor networks by looking at a particular sensor network node named MULLE [14].
A number of methods for mitigating the effects of IEMI on sensor networks were observed
including shielding, redundancy, and different forms of communication. J. Delsing et al.
observed that because of the size of the MULLE it shouldn’t be susceptible to IEMI at low
frequencies but rather at high frequencies in the gigahertz range. The lack of susceptibility
at low frequencies was verified by using standard electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)
testing signals with amplification and a BiLog antenna from 80 MHz - 1000 MHz with
field strengths of 10 - 20 V/m [14]. No IEMI effects were observed for these tests. The
effects of frequencies in the gigahertz range were then tested using the same methodology.
These tests revealed that the sensor node was susceptible to frequencies around 2 GHz
with an electrical field around .2 kV/m. J. Delsing et al. conclude that sensor networks
need improved immunity to IEMI and that “current research in sensor networks does not
consider IEMI to be a serious threat [14].”
Yasser Shoukry et al. conducted an IEMI attack against the anti-lock braking system
(ABS) in a car [13]. They did this by attacking the magnetic speed sensors used on individual wheels to provide input to ABS control algorithms. Magnetic speed sensors work by
measuring the changes in the magnetic flux density caused by the movement of a ferromagnetic toothed gear or tone gear that is placed in front of it. To affect the measurements,
Yasser Shoukry et al. designed custom hardware with a PCB coil that was placed between
the tone gear and the sensor. Using this hardware, they were able to cancel the legitimate
signal from the tone gear and effectively control the value read by the magnetic speed sensor. They then simulated the effect their most successful attack would have on a car driving
on an icy road. This simulation showed that their attack caused the driver to lose control
of the car and careen off the road. As defined by Mats G. Backstrom and Karl Gunnar
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Lovstrand, this attack was a front-door attack since the sensor could not be shielded and
operated at the same frequency as the sensor.
Denis Foo Kune et al. researched baseband and modulated IEMI attacks [5]. Both
of these attacks were back-door coupling attacks since they targeted circuitry that could
potentially be shielded. Both attacks assumed that a filter was placed in between the
sensor and the microcontroller and that they were attacking analog sensors operating on
the order of millivolts. Baseband attacks took place in the same frequency range as the
signals being generated and were nearly impossible to filter out because doing so would
filter out legitimate signals. Modulated attacks took place at a higher frequency and used
some part of the circuit to down-modulate their attack into the baseband. The authors
attempted both attacks in their paper with varying success [5].
For the baseband attack, Kune et al. used a simple whip pole antenna, audio amplifier,
and an arbitrary function generator (AFG) to attack cardiac implanted electrical devices
(CIEDs) [5]. Since the baseband frequency for a CIED is between 0.1 Hz and 1 kHz this
frequency range was used for the attack. With this setup, they were able to stop pacing
from 0.68 - 1.57 m away when the device was exposed to free air, however, when they
covered the ECG with a saline fluid they were unable to stop pacing even from 2 - 3 cm
away.
One of the weaknesses of this experimental setup was the use of a simple whip pole
antenna. For a whip pole antenna to have an effective transmission, it should be half or a
quarter of the wavelength of the transmission frequency [15]. Using equation 2.1, where c
is the speed of light (3 ∗ 108 ) in meters per second, f is the frequency in hertz, and λ is the
wavelength in meters, it can be seen that a quarter wavelength antenna with a transmission
frequency of 1 kHz would need to be 75,000 m.

λ=

c
f

(2.1)

For the modulated attack, a signal generator was used to modulate and transmit using
monopole and dipole antennas to attack various microphones. Different frequencies were
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used depending on the microphone that was attacked. These ranged from around 800 MHz
to 1.2 GHz. All the attacks that were tested relied on nonlinear elements of the amplifier
to demodulate the attack signal that was transmitted to the microphone. The attack was
tested in three different cases: automated dialing, session hijacking, and denial of services
(DoS). The attack was successfully demonstrated in all three cases. For automated dialing,
the attackers successfully entered credit card information over a phone using the antenna.
Session hijacking was a partial success; while the original user could not be completely
overwhelmed, they were pushed to the background. The DoS attack, however, was able to
completely overwhelm the user’s voice, rendering the phone call useless.

2.3

Changing GPIO Readings
To the knowledge of the author, no work has attempted to influence GPIO pins using

an IEMI attack. The most similar work that was found was done by A. Boyer et al. and
created a model of the harmonic susceptibility of integrated circuits (ICs) to direct power
injection attacks [16]. They started by conducting a direct power injection attack against a
16-bit microcontroller created with 0.25 µm technology. The authors found that the amount
of power required to change the value of the digital logic increased nearly exponentially as
the frequency of the injected signal increased. They noted that if the voltage of the injected
signal was high enough it could induce rectification using the ESD protection that was built
into the pin. They also found that the susceptibility of the pin depended on its supply
network. Their model showed that a major factor in the susceptibility of a pin to power
injection attacks was the input capacitance. It also showed that the power necessary to
change the pin state at higher frequencies increased because of the changes in the impedance
of the pin. As the frequency increased, so did the impedance of the pin.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORY AND MODELS

3.1

Threat Model
A single attacker against a victim circuit with a single sensor is assumed for this

research. The attacker is able to gain physical proximity to the victim circuit but can only
interact with it through IEMI. A system diagram of this is shown in Figure 3.1. The ideal
range for these types of attacks is dependent on the frequency and power of the attack but
is generally under 5 m. Because of limitations in power and antenna design, this research
limits its examination of the attack to 5 cm.
The goal of the attacker is to control the output that the victim perceives. For an
analog-to-digital converter (ADC) the attacker wants to be able to increase or decrease the
output value of the sensor at the input to the microcontroller. For a GPIO pin, the attacker
wants to be able to flip the bit that is being sent from one microcontroller to another. The
attacker is assumed to have access to any hardware required to mount the attack (ie. power
supplies, RF amplifier, signal generator, etc.). This work does not consider transmission
power directly, though most attacks could be improved by increasing the transmission power.

Attack Circuit

Victim Circuit
Sensor

RFsig

RFamp
Fig. 3.1: System model for IEMI attacks.

M icrocontroller
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3.2

Theoretical Model of IEMI Attacks
IEMI attacks depend on Faraday’s law of induction, which states that a time-varying

EM field through a loop will induce a time-varying voltage and current in that loop. The
mathematical description of Faraday’s law is shown in Equation 3.1.

Vemf

d
= −N
dt

Z
Bds

(3.1)

S

Where Vemf is the induced voltage or electromotive force, N is the number of turns in a
coil, B is the magnetic flux density, and the integral is taken over the surface area of the
loop [17]. B is in reference to a point in space and can be converted to the magnetic field
intensity H using a magnetization factor or permeability µ as shown in Equation 3.2.

B = µH

(3.2)

Therefore, the amount of induced voltage depends on the H field in a loop. For an IEMI
attack, the victim circuit forms the loop that is being influenced. Therefore, maximizing
the amount of H field will increase the effectiveness of the attack. There are two parts to
maximizing the H field: first, the region of the field where the attack is conducted, and
second, the antenna that is used. Different antennas have different amounts of directivity.
The directivity of an antenna is defined to be “the ratio of the radiation intensity in a given
direction from the antenna to the radiation intensity averaged over all directions [15].”
This means that the more directed an antenna is, the more intense the radiated field is in
a particular direction.
For an RF antenna, the region around the antenna can be separated out into two
regions: the near field and the far field. In the near field region, the relationship between
E and H is complicated and depends on the antenna that is being used [18]. In the far
field region, E and H are proportional and locally orthogonal [18]. Determining the exact
boundary between the near field and far field is difficult since multiple definitions exist.
Introduction to Electromagnetic Compatibility by Clayton R. Paul defines the boundary to

10
be “the larger of 3λ0 or 2D2 /λ, where D is the largest dimension of the antenna [18]” and
λ0 is the wavelength. Antenna Theory and Analysis by Constantine A. Balanis generally
defines the boundary to be 2D2 /λ [15]. Most other definitions define the boundary to be
N λ from the antenna where N can be 2, 4, 5, or 10. For the purposes of this research, the
near field is considered to be closer than 5λ of the transmission frequency. Therefore, most
of the experiments that are done in this work take place in the near field.
The voltage induced in a loop depends on the amount and direction of change in the
H field. An increase in the intensity of the H field induces a higher voltage potential in
the loop, while a decrease in the intensity of the H field creates a lower potential voltage in
the loop. Equation 3.1 describes this behavior mathematically. This provides a potential
method for controlling the voltage induced in the circuit. This control will increase the
effectiveness of IEMI attacks by allowing the attacker to control how they affect the circuit.
This also increases the efficacy of the attack since it allows the attacker to increase and
decrease the voltage in the victim circuit and affect a variety of sensors.
Another vital section of the attack takes place in the victim circuit. Because the induced
waveform is an AC signal, it must be converted to DC in order to effectively change the
value of a sensor or GPIO pin. This can be accomplished using the inherent rectification
in the GPIO pin which is caused by the presence of diodes in the electro-static discharge
(ESD) protection for the pin as shown in Figure 3.2 [16]. How this is accomplished can
be understood by examining the equation for the forward current through a single diode,
shown in Equation 3.3.




qV
−1
Id = Is exp
kT

(3.3)

Where Id is the forward current of the diode, Is is the reverse saturation current, q is the
electron charge, V is the forward voltage across the diode, T is the absolute temperature
of the diode in Kelvin, and k is Boltzmann’s constant. Using Taylor series, the exponential

11

Fig. 3.2: Model of the ESD protection of an I/O pin.

term in Equation 3.3 can be expanded to Equation 3.4.




 qV
+
Id = Is 
kT

qV
kT

2!

2


+

qV
kT

3!

3


+

qV
kT

4!

4



+ .....

(3.4)

If an AC voltage as shown in Equation 3.5 is inserted into Equation 3.4, then Equation 3.6
can be obtained. As can be seen, the terms that are raised to an even power have a DC
component.
V = A.sin(2πf t)

(3.5)
3

t)
( q×A.sin(2πf
)
(qA)2
(qA)2 cos(4πf t)
q × A.sin(2πf t)
kT
+
−
+
+ .....)
Id = Is (
2
2
kT
4 (kT )
4 (kT )
3!

(3.6)

The main disadvantage to using the ESD diodes to do the DC rectification is that higher
frequencies require more power input to have an effect. This was observed by A. Boyer et
al. [16] and confirmed in this research as shown in Figure 3.3, which shows the amount of
power seen by the microcontroller, from a directly injected signal with a constant amplitude.
Supporting the previous observation, the amount of power received by the microcontroller
decreases as the frequency increases.
Another source of rectification can be the way that the measurements are taken. Many
applications use the ADC on a microcontroller to directly acquire values from sensors.
These applications usually do not rely on a single value from the ADC, instead, they rely
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Direct Injection Attack: ADC Measurements
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Fig. 3.3: ADC measurements from a microcontroller’s GPIO pin when an AC signal was
injected directly onto the pin.
on a averaged value of several measurements. Since ADCs on microcontrollers are typically
clamped between 0 and 3.3 or 5 V, they won’t usually report a negative voltage. Therefore,
an IEMI attack against a microcontroller using an ADC will cause a non-zero increase in
the measured value even if the received signal has a mean of zero.

3.3

First-Order Model of the Victim Circuit
To gain an idea of the potential effect of IEMI attacks at various frequencies, a first-

order circuit model of the victim circuit (shown in Figure 3.4) was examined before any
experiments were done. In this model, VDD represents the power supply of a sensor. L2
is the parasitic inductance that exists between the sensor and the power supply. Sensor
represents the location of the sensor in the circuit, although its circuit effects are considered
to be mostly inductive and can, therefore, be lumped in with the value of L2 . R1 is the
resistance between the power supply and ground. L1 is the parasitic inductance that exists
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after the sensor. C is the capacitance introduced by the I/O pin from the microcontroller
and other parasitic capacitances between the sensor and ground. This model had limited
accuracy and only provided a rudimentary understanding of how the victim circuit behaved.
IEMI attacks on this circuit using inductive coupling could be modeled by treating the attack
as a weak transformer between L2 and the attack circuit. This transformer is assumed to
have a very poor coupling coefficient and a small number of turns; since only some of the
transmitted EM radiation will reach the victim circuit and the victim circuit was never
designed to act as a transformer.
Using the described model, two types of IEMI attacks can be observed: nonresonant
and resonant. The resonant frequency is also called the natural response of a circuit and
refers to how a circuit dissipates stored energy [19]. Nonresonant attacks can occur at any
frequency that effectively transfers power to the victim circuit that is not resonating in the
victim circuit. The victim circuit will be inefficient at receiving this transferred power and
because of this, nonresonant attacks may not be effective. The effectiveness of transferring
power at nonresonant frequencies depends heavily on the physical parameters of the circuit
and, therefore, cannot be predicted from this model. Resonant frequency attacks occur at
a frequency that resonates in the victim circuit. This will allow the attacker to build up
energy in the victim circuit, potentially increasing the efficiency of the power transfer [20].
This increased efficiency could allow the attacker to use less power while making the attack.
This model can identify if a resonant frequency below 1 GHz can exist in a victim circuit

L2

Vattack

L0

VDD

sensor
R1

+
−

C
L1

Fig. 3.4: Schematic of the first-order model of the victim circuit.
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and give some insight about resonant IEMI attacks.
Using the circuit shown in Figure 3.4, a mathematical model for the expected resonant
frequency was derived. The circuit element labeled sensor was assumed to be mostly
inductive and was therefore lumped in with L2 . The mathematical model that was obtained
from doing this can be seen in Equation 3.7 where ω = 2πf and the other terms are the
circuit elements.

0 = ω 4 c2 L21 L2 − ω 2 CL1 (L1 + 2L2 ) + ω 2 R2 C 2 L2 − R2 C + L1 + L2

(3.7)

From this equation, the resonant frequency is solved for using several sets of values. Using
reasonable values from data sheets, such as R1 = 100k, L1 = 100nH, L2 = 170nH, and
C = 10pF the resonant frequency of the circuit was 122 MHz, a value within the defined
attack range. Further experimentation with different values showed that the value of the
resistance had only a small effect on the resonant frequency, while the values of L2 and
C played the most important roles. Note that the resonant frequency got lower for larger
values of L2 and C.
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CHAPTER 4
ATTACKING ANALOG TO DIGITAL CONVERTERS (ADC’S)
This section details the setups and results for both the attacker and victim circuits
when the victim used the analog to digital converter (ADC) on the Tiva C microcontroller
to take the measurements of a sensor. This circuit was used as the starting point since the
level of influence of the attacker was directly measurable. This chapter is broken up into
two sections. The first section details the materials and setup of each circuit. The second
section details the experimental results. Before these experiments were attempted, there
was extensive experimentation with the attacker and victim setups without the presence
of the microcontroller. These experiments helped determine the values of resistors and the
layout of the circuit. They also showed that the output of the RF amplifiers used in the
attacker circuit varied with the frequency of the input waveform. This variation was caused
by the lack of impedance matching in the attack circuit. Therefore, it was necessary to be
aware of variations in the output of the RF amplifier.

4.1

Setup
This section described the materials and setup of the individual circuits that were used.

First, the physical materials and setup will be described. Second, any intangible elements
will be described.

4.1.1

Victim Setup

The victim circuit has three parts: the physical circuit, the system level victim setup,
and the code running on the microcontroller. For this work, the Tiva C microcontroller
was used [21]. This was used for several reasons: its availability, extensive documentation,
familiarity, and low cost. A circuit diagram of the victim circuit is shown in Figure 4.2 and
a picture is shown in Figure 4.1. For D1 shown in Figure 4.2 an SFH 235 FA photodiode was
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Fig. 4.1: Picture of the victim cir- Fig. 4.2: Schematic of the first victim circuit setup.
cuit.
used, an infrared photodiode with a sunlight filter. Several diodes were examined, however,
this one was selected because of its availability and the simple setup that was required. The
values for R1 and Vin were 10 kΩ and 10V respectively, both of which are in the operating
region of D1 . The physical layout of the board went through two iterations. The first
iteration was set up on a bread board and can be seen in Figure 4.1. This was done for
speed, simplicity, and flexibility. The results of experiments done with this setup showed
that the material setup could significantly influence the results. To reduce the number of
variables in the material setup and minimize cable lengths, the same board was put on a
printed circuit board (PCB), shown in Figure 4.3. During this change, the value of R1 was
changed to 22 kΩ.
The setup of the system containing the victim circuit, Tiva C microcontroller, CPS250
triple output power supply, and a laptop can be seen in Figure 4.4. The Tiva C microcontroller’s ADC measured the output of D1 in the victim circuit, as the schematic in Figure
4.2 shows. The Tiva C microcontroller was also connected to a laptop for power and to
provide the user a method for interfacing with the microcontroller. The CPS250 triple
output power supply provided Vin for the victim circuit.
The code that was on the microcontroller served two purposes: to take measurements
like a victim circuit and to provide an interface for data output. When simulating a potential
victim circuit, the code initialized the microcontroller so that it took regular measurements
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Fig. 4.3: Picture of the victim circuit Fig. 4.4: Picture of the setup of the
victim system.
on a PCB.
with the ADC. For comparison, these measurements were then stored so that they could
be averaged and the behavior of the circuit analyzed. This was accomplished using a
timer and the ADC. The timer was initialized to be periodic with a 4-microsecond interval
that triggered the ADC when it expired. The ADC was initialized to take and store a
measurement when the timer interrupt was thrown. This sequence of events made it so
that measurements were taken periodically with the timer and stored to be read out later.
The timer value of 4 µs was determined empirically as the shortest period that allowed the
program to execute normally. To output data, a serial connection was created between the
microcontroller and the laptop.

4.1.2

Light Circuit Setup

The light circuit was used in some experiments to stimulate the photodiode used in the
design of the victim circuit. A picture of the circuit that was used is shown in Figure 4.5
and a schematic of the circuit that was used is shown in Figure 4.6. An HIR323C Infrared
LED was used for Dlight and was selected as the diode because the wavelength of light it
emitted correlated well with the wavelength that D1 in the victim circuit (Figure 4.2) was
sensitive to. In this circuit, the value of Rlight was set to 51 Ω to reduce the amount of
voltage required to turn Dlight on. The value of VLightSupply was determined manually by
comparing the output of the ADC to the desired value.

4.1.3

Attacker Setup

The attacker circuit was composed of the physical circuit and the equipment connected
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Fig. 4.6: Schematic of the light cirFig. 4.5: Picture of the light circuit. cuit.
to it, which controlled the input to the circuit. All inputs into the attacker circuit were
selected by hand because of the complexity that automation would present. A picture of
the attacker circuit is shown in Figure 4.7 and a circuit diagram is shown in Figure 4.8. The
attack circuit was set up on a breadboard. This was largely done because of the choice of
antenna, which was modeled as L1 in the circuit diagram and was made by creating a coil of
wire from approximately 25 ft (7.6 m) of 22 gauge mag-wire and a plastic spool. The gauge
of wire was selected for its ability to handle the current. The antenna was created this

Vin

RFamp
RFamp
Vin

R1

P robeL1

R1
Probe
L1
Fig. 4.7: Picture of the attacker cir- Fig. 4.8: Schematic of the attacker
circuit setup.
cuit.
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way to maximize inductance and therefore maximize the inductive coupling that occurred
between the attacker and victim circuits. As noted earlier, this was believed to be the most
efficient method of conducting this type of attack. A high power potentiometer was used
for R1 . This was done to make it easy to experiment with different values for R1 . The
RFamp was broadband to allow for experiments over a range of frequencies and provided
enough power to make the experiments possible. Over the course of this research, two
different RF amplifiers (ZHL-6A+ and ZHL-1A) were used. The ZHL-6A+ provided 22
dBm power output and the ZHL-1A provided 28 dBm power output according to the data
sheets [22, 23]. The ZHL-1A amplifier was acquired later and was used exclusively in latter
experiments because it had a higher power output. Two different input sources were used
as an input source to the RF amplifiers: first, a Tektronix AFG 3252 dual channel arbitrary
function generator and second, a Hewlett Packard ESG-3000a signal generator. The AFG
3252 was used for most low-frequency experiments because it was readily available and
capable of providing a sine wave input from 0 - 240 MHz [24]. The ESG-3000a was used
for all high-frequency experiments, since it could provide a sine wave output from 250 kHz
- 3 GHz, and was used to verify the results of many of the low-frequency experiments [25].

4.2

Experimental Results
The experiments were sensitive to the environment and often measured small effects.

Therefore, to ensure accurate measurements and correct understanding, the first step was
to understand how the setup and environment affected the measurements. This process
is detailed in Section 4.2.1. The remaining sections deal with how different variables affected the attack. First, the effects from a different physical layout of the victim circuit
are discussed. Second, the effects of using different sampling times in the victim circuit
are discussed. Third, the effects that different orientations of the transmitting coil had are
covered. Finally, the effectiveness of the attack at different frequencies is discussed.
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4.2.1

Accuracy of Experimental Results

For the initial sets of experiments, the victim circuit (Figure 4.2) was placed approximately 5 cm in front of the attack circuit (Figure 4.8) with the photodiode positioned at
approximately the center of L1 . The victim circuit was placed 5 cm away to maximize
the power provided by the RF amplifier since it only provided about half a watt. It was
concluded from previous works and EM theory that the amount of power used was critical
to an experiment’s success. The validity of doing this attack in a lower power environment at close range was also seen from the model of the attack presented in Section 3.2.
Power decays with distance at a rate of r4 where r is the distance from the antenna. A
Tektronix MDO4000 oscilloscope was used to measure the output of the RF amplifier in
the attacker circuit. The initial results using the ZHL-6A+ are shown in Figure 4.9. These
measurements were intended to help identify the resonant frequency of the circuit because
it was impossible to measure the parasitic elements of the circuit adequately in order to
calculate the resonant frequency. The idea was that the largest peak in the measurements
would likely correspond with the resonant frequency. These initial results raised concerns
about the accuracy of the electrical circuit model that was presented Section 3.2. From this
model, a single resonant frequency and, therefore, a single large peak was predicted. However, these results showed four peaks, two of which were similar in strength and obviously
not harmonics of each other. What caused the four peaks and why did they appear to be
unrelated?
Since these were the first experimental tests, the validity of the model was investigated
first. It was assumed that the two largest peaks occurred because of resonant frequencies
inside the circuit. For this to be the case, there needed to exist multiple resonant cavities
inside the circuit. To examine this possibility, several models that accounted for additional
parasitic elements in the circuit and a more extensive model of the microcontroller pin were
examined. However, these models ultimately couldn’t account for the second peak when
realistic values were used. The second possibility investigated was that these peaks were
caused by interference from another source or from some aspect of the setup. In the process
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Fig. 4.9: ADC measurements using the ZHL-6A+ amplifier as an input
to the attacker and a sensor output of 0.

of investigating the setup, it was discovered that the position of the wire connecting the
oscilloscope to its probe affected the measurements, specifically the second peak around 135
MHz. Further experimentation showed that when the oscilloscope wire came close to the
power cables supplying power to the victim circuit or other parts of the circuit, greater effects
were measured and the second peak around 135 MHz appeared. The most likely reason for
this is that the oscilloscope wire itself was acting as an antenna and coupling power to the
victim circuit instead of L1 because of its proximity to parts of the victim circuit. This led
to an investigation of other cables in the setup to determine if any other unintended coupling
was occurring. This experimentation showed that if any cables connected to the opposite
setups were close to each other, the measurements were affected. To prevent any unintended
coupling from occurring, the wires for the attacker and victim circuit were separated from
each other as much as possible. After the separation of wires was completed, experiments
to be sure the oscilloscope probe wasn’t acting as an unintended antenna were conducted
with and without the oscilloscope probe connected to the output of the amplifier. Some of
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the first sets of measurements that were done this way can be seen in Figure 4.10.
As can be seen clearly from Figure 4.10, when the oscilloscope probe was present in
the attack circuit, the attack was able to transfer an additional 100 mV at 100 MHz and
approximately 300 mV at 210 MHz, making the attack much more effective. Was the
oscilloscope probe acting like an antenna again or was it changing something fundamentally
in the circuit? To determine if the oscilloscope was acting like an antenna, the position of
the probe relative to cables connected to the victim circuit was experimented with. This
was done by fixing the input frequency to the amplifier and moving the cable to several
positions and seeing if the average value of ADC readings changed meaningfully. Several
frequencies were tried but no meaningful changes in the average value of the ADC readings
were observed. From this experiment, it was concluded that the oscilloscope probe was
improving the transmission of the attack circuit. To attempt to replicate these effects,
capacitors were added in parallel with the output of the amplifier. Since the estimated
capacitance present in the probe was 3.5 pF, the values of capacitors tested were 3, 4, and 5
pFs. The results of this test are shown in Figure 4.11. For these experiments, values equal
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Fig. 4.10: ADC measurements with and without the oscilloscope probe.
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Fig. 4.11: Effects of adding capacitors instead of the oscilloscope probe.

to or less than 425 mV were read, which was similar to the results of experiments done
without a probe. Experiments done with the probe consistently measured around 550 mV
which is about 125 mV more than experiments without a probe. To definitively prove if the
circuit characteristics of the attacker changed, a network analyzer was used to measure the
S function of the attacker circuit without power from 0 - 1 GHz. These results are shown
in Figures 4.12 and 4.13. These figures show that the S11 response of the circuit improved
when the oscilloscope probe was present, confirming the theory that the presence of the
probe improved the transmission of the attacker circuit.

4.2.2

Physical Layout

This section focuses on the effects that the physical setup of the victim circuit had on
the effectiveness of the IEMI attack. The results of these experiments combined with the
results of Section 4.2.1 lead to the creation of the PCB setup of the victim circuit. For
these experiments, the victim circuit was placed approximately 5 cm away from the attack
circuit. The photodiode was positioned to be in the center of L1 with the microcontroller 2
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Fig. 4.12: Frequency response without the oscilloscope probe.

Fig. 4.13: Frequency response with the oscilloscope probe.
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- 3 cm further back and offset to the side of D1 . With this physical setup, frequency sweeps
were done with a fixed power input of approximately 9 dBm or 600 mV. These experiments
were done after the separation of cables described in Section 4.2.1 took place.
Two circuit factors were investigated: first, pin usage for the ADC and second, the
lead lengths of different connections. The first question - does the pin that is used make a
difference to the effectiveness of IEMI attacks - had several implications. If using different
pins to take measurements affected the effectiveness of IEMI attacks, the danger of these
attacks could be easily minimized. The researchers identified the pins’ proximity to ground
as a potential cause of these differences. The theory was that proximity to a ground plane
could reduce the effectiveness of the attack for two reasons. First, it could absorb more of
the EMI and second, it could reduce the size of any fluctuations in the ground plane relative
to the pin. Both of these factors could potentially reduce the effectiveness of the attack.
To see if this was the case, two different pins were used to take ADC measurements: PE3
and PB5. Pin PB5 was selected because of its proximity to a ground pin, while pin PE3
was selected because it was far away from a ground pin. The results of these experiments
can be seen in Figure 4.14 and show that little, if any, effect from using a different pin was
observed.
The second question - do the lead lengths make a difference to the effectiveness of
IEMI attacks - also had clear implications. If lead lengths affected the effectiveness of IEMI
attacks, protecting a circuit could be as simple as shortening lead lengths. Changing the
lead lengths had multiple effects on the circuit. First, increasing or decreasing the lead
lengths changed the value of parasitic inductance or capacitance that existed in the circuit,
potentially affecting the resonant frequency. Second, the lead lengths affected the ability
of the wire to act as an antenna for different frequencies. Third, it changed the sizes of
loops in the circuit potentially changing the amount of the H field passing through the loop
and thus affecting the amount of energy that was transferred. To determine the impact
of these effects, the lead lengths of several connections were examined on the breadboard
setup. These experiments were done using PB5 to take the ADC measurement with the
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Fig. 4.14: Comparison of the effects of using PE3 vs. PB5 as the input
to the ADC.

attacker and victim circuit as previously described. First, the length of connections between
the breadboard and the microcontroller were examined. These leads connected the ADC
pin to the output of the photodiode and provided a common ground. The two lead lengths
that were used were 20 cm and 5 cm. The microcontroller had previously been positioned
so that its position relative to the rest of the circuit did not change when new leads were
connected. The prediction was that the peaks that were seen might increase in frequency
as it was believed that the resonant frequency played a significant role. The results of this
experiment are shown in Figure 4.15.
The most noticeable change was the absence of the peak around 100 MHz, which was
unexpected. If this peak was caused by resonant coupling, as was first hypothesized, the
peak should have shifted, not disappeared. The absence of the peak suggested that another
factor was primarily or totally responsible for it. Another supporting factor for this was
that the other peaks in the circuit’s response remained unchanged. This suggested that the
resonant frequency may not be the dominant factor at low frequencies.
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Fig. 4.15: Comparison of the effects of using different lengths of header
pin cables.

To further test how lead lengths affected the response of the circuit, the power leads
were examined. The power leads of the circuit were nearly 1 m or 100 cm long, much
larger than the 15-cm difference between the different connectors. For this experiment, an
additional set of power leads was connected to the victim circuit. This made the total length
of the power leads 2 m or 200 cm. The additional lengths of power cables were positioned
so that the position of the power cables relative to the victim circuit was similar to previous
experiments. The position of the rest of the victim circuit didn’t change at all. After the
additional power cables were connected, the experiment as described above was conducted
again. Those results are shown in Figures 4.16 and 4.17. When there was only one set of
power leads there was a clear peak around 40 MHz. This peak shifted to 15 MHz with the
addition of the second set of leads, validating the hypothesis that the peak would shift to a
lower frequency with the addition of more power cables.
The results presented in this section show that the length of connections in the victim
circuit played an important role in the circuit’s susceptibility to IEMI attacks. Long lead
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Fig. 4.16: ADC measurements with one power lead.
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Fig. 4.17: ADC measurements with two power leads.
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lengths consistently showed higher effects from IEMI attacks. To minimize these effects and
to provide a consistent setup, a PCB board was created using the schematic and circuit
values described in Section 4.1.1. The PCB board was connected directly to the header on
the back of the Tiva C and was approximately 1 cm by 3 cm in total size. This size estimate
excludes the SMA connectors that were attached to the circuit board. This entire setup
was then placed 5 cm from the attack circuit and frequency sweeps from 5 - 240 MHz were
done. The input power to the amplifier was 1.2 Vpp which is .424 Vrms or approximately
6 dBm. These experiments were expected to show two things: a dramatic decrease in the
amount of coupled voltage and changes in the effective frequencies for coupling energy to
the circuit. The results of these experiments are shown in Figure 4.18. As can be seen, the
effect was greatly reduced. When the experiment was done using the breadboard, values 500
- 800 mV were consistently found. However, when the PCB was used, at most 60 mV were
detected. This is approximately an order of magnitude decrease in the coupled energy for
the same transmission power. The experimental results of increasing the transmission power
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Fig. 4.18: ADC measurements from the PCB setup with an attacker input
power of 6 dBm or 1.2 Vpp.
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to 5.6 Vpp or 2 Vrms , which is approximately 19 dBm, and redoing the experiment showed
a maximum influence around 140 mV as shown in Figure 4.19. These results were still
significantly less than the results from when the breadboard was used, despite increasing
the power by a factor of 4.1. Another note is that the peaks of highest influence were
seen in different locations on the PCB than the breadboard setup. The major peaks in
the breadboard were around 30 MHz and 45 MHz where on the PCB they were around 45
MHz and 65 MHz. This shift in the peaks was probably partially due to decreased stray
inductances caused by decreased area and wire size. These results support the previous
experiments and show that IEMI attacks require more power when lead lengths are shorter.

4.2.3

Sampling Time Effects

Denis Foo Kune et al. discussed the use of ADCs for demodulating AC signals. They
observed that by matching the sampling frequency of the ADC with the attack signal the
ADC would demodulate the signal. Clearly, this would be an ideal way to attack an ADC
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Fig. 4.19: ADC measurements from PCB setup with an attacker input
power of 19 dBm or 5.6 Vpp
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since it would allow the attacker complete control of the signal measured by the ADC. A
question related to this theory is how different ADC sampling frequencies affect the results
of an IEMI attack, especially when the sampling frequencies of the ADC don’t correspond
well with the attack frequency. To test this, the PCB victim circuit was placed 5 cm from
the attacking circuit using a power input of 19 dBm. Sweeps of possible attack frequencies
from 0 - 240 MHz were done with changes in the sampling frequency of the ADC. If this
effect made a significant difference, then the effective frequencies for an IEMI attack on a
circuit should have changed with changes in sampling time. To see if this was the case,
experiments were run with sampling times of 4, 8, and 25 µs which translate into sampling
frequencies of 250, 125, and 40 kHz. The results of these experiments can be seen in Figure
4.20. The most interesting result of these tests was that the average value seen by the
ADC didn’t really change when the sample time was changed. This suggests that while
the sample time may affect the measurements that are done, it does not affect the most
efficient attack frequency. The Nyquist theory may provide a partial explanation for this.
More detailed experiments would need to be done to be sure. Since the sampling frequency
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Fig. 4.20: ADC measurements comparing different sample times.
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was significantly less than twice the attack frequency, the bandwidth of the ADC may
have been too small to detect changes in the attack frequency. Small variations in the
attack signal would contribute to this problem. The effects that Nyquist theory describes,
combined with the effects of averaging of the measurements, which reduces measurement
noise, may explain why IEMI attacks significantly above the Nyquist frequency seemed
unaffected by the sampling time. Some support for this can be seen in Figure 4.21, which
shows 10,000 consecutive values read by the ADC before they are averaged together. This
shows that the value read by the ADC varies widely over time and may provide a potential
way of detecting IEMI attacks. It also shows that while different sampling frequencies may
increase or decrease the effectiveness of the attack, the attack will always be able to be
conducted. These effects may be specific to sine wave input attacks since these attacks
are inefficient because the mean value of a sine wave is zero, and a sine wave spends equal
amounts of time with an increasing and decreasing slope.
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Fig. 4.21: 10,000 consecutive ADC measurements at 40 MHz.
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4.2.4

Increasing or Decreasing ADC Measurements

One of the goals of this research was to show that it is possible to both increase and
decrease the average value seen by the microcontroller using its ADC. Theoretically, this
could be accomplished by inverting the EM field. With a coil, the inverse EM field can be
obtained by reversing the direction of the winding on a coil or reversing the direction the
coil faces. To determine if this would provide a way for the attacker to control if they were
increasing or decreasing the victim circuit’s readings, two experiments were conducted with
opposite orientations. These experiments were done using the bread board setup positioned
approximately 5 cm from the coil. The results of these experiments are shown in Figures
4.22 and 4.23. They show that changing the orientation of the coil didn’t affect the results
that were seen when the output of the light sensor was zero. In both cases, the attack was
conducted using the same voltage at the same frequencies.
This calls into question if IEMI attacks using a sine wave input will be able to decrease
the average value read by an ADC on a microcontroller. To determine if this was the case,
a variety of tests were conducted using the light circuit described in Section 4.1.2. This
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Fig. 4.22: ADC measurements with coil facing forward.
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Average ADC Reading: Coil Facing Backward
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Fig. 4.23: ADC measurements with coil facing backward.

circuit was added to the setup to provide stimulation for the light sensor. This circuit was
positioned 3 - 5 cm away from the D1 in the victim circuit on the same breadboard and was
powered from a separate output of the same dual channel power supply that was powering
the victim circuit. Using the light circuit, the average output of the ADC on the Tiva C
was increased to just over 3 V and 3.2 V for two separate sets of tests. The results of
these experiments can be seen in Figure 4.24. These results show that the IEMI attack
was able to decrease the average value of the ADC, regardless of the orientation of the
coil or sensor output. In addition to this, Figure 4.24 displays other interesting qualities.
First, the frequency that had the largest effect was around 25 MHz, which is one of the
frequencies that was very effective at increasing the average value of the ADC. Second, the
peak at 45 MHz was reduced to almost nothing and was only noticeable when the output of
D1 was around 3.2 V. Also, there was an additional small peak around 100 MHz that did
not show up in the previous experiment. The final interesting note is that even though all
four experiments used the same setup, with the exception of the intensity of light, all of the
measurements taken with an attack signal of 25 MHz and 100 MHz were almost identical.
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Fig. 4.24: Results of testing with a high output from the light sensor.

This suggests that the effective frequency of IEMI attacks that attempt to increase
or decrease the average value measured by the ADC are related since 25 MHz was one of
the most effective frequencies for changing the average value of the ADC in both cases.
However, the exact nature of the relationship between attacks that increase or decrease a
sensor’s average output is unclear because of the reaction of the circuit at 45 MHz and
100 MHz. The behavior of the circuit at these frequencies presents two concerns. The
first concern is that the 100 MHz peak was only present in these experiments when the
attacker was trying to decrease the value read by the ADC, though it was seen on occasion
in other experiments, suggesting that it may have been caused by environmental factors.
Unfortunately, this was never definitively determined. The second concern is the fact that
all of the experiments that attempted to decrease the average value output by the ADC
had nearly the same value at 25 MHz and 100 MHz, despite having two different voltage
offsets, which suggests that there may be a limit on how far a sine wave can decrease the
average value of the ADC.
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4.2.5

Resonant Coupling

This section details the experiments that were done to determine the resonant frequency
of the victim circuit and what the effectiveness of a resonant IEMI attack was for this
research. The results presented in this section were obtained by placing the PCB victim
circuit approximately 5 cm in front of the attacker circuit. Other experiments were done
but will not be presented since the PCB setup most accurately represents a real victim.
The first difficulty in testing the effectiveness of a resonant attack is identifying if an attack
is at the resonant frequency. This can’t be done mathematically because the existence of a
resonant attack relies on the effects of parasitic elements in the circuit which are difficult
to measure accurately. Several methods of identifying the resonant frequency of the circuit
were attempted. First, frequency sweeps were done to look for the peak response. This
method assumed there would be a single peak and that this peak would correspond to the
resonant frequency, which could then be verified. However, the existence of multiple peaks
and the difficulty of identifying environmental factors made this method ineffective. To
remove environmental and setup variables, a network analyzer was used to measure the
S11 response of the entire circuit. An AT-N9914A FIELDFOX was used to take these
measurements of the victim circuit from 0 - 1 GHz and the results can be seen in Figure
4.25. This shows that three peaks existed for the received power of the setup, around 600,
745, and 839 MHz respectively. Additional measurements on multiple circuits led to the
conclusion that the resonant frequency was around 745 MHz, which was on the high end of
the intended frequency range of the attack. To test the effectiveness of a resonant attack,
several frequency sweeps were done from 0 - 800 MHz. These experiments didn’t show any
power being coupled to the victim circuit at frequencies above 400 MHz. The results of one
of these sweeps are shown in Figure 4.26. This lack of success could be due to any number
of factors that are beyond the scope of this research. One possibility is the equipment that
was used. The antenna, a coil of mag-wire, was not impedance matched nor did it function
well at high frequencies. Furthermore, the ZHL-1A amplifier is only rated to 500 MHz
and the frequency of the attack is well above that. Another plausible reason, or at least a
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Fig. 4.25: S11 measurements from the network analyzer from 0 - 1 GHz.

Fig. 4.26: Voltage read by the ADC of the microcontroller over an 800
MHz attack sweep.

contributing factor, is explained by A. Boyer et al. Their study modeled and tested a direct
power injection attack on a 16-bit microcontroller, and found that the amount of power
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required to flip a bit increased with attack frequency [16].

4.3

Summary of Experiments
No new information is presented in this section. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 summarize the

experiments that were done to obtain the graphs that are presented in this chapter and the
reference for the graph.

Table 4.1: Table of Graphs in ATTACKING ANALOG TO DIGITAL CONVERTERS
(ADC’S) including a brief description and figure number.
Description
Figure Number
This shows initial experiments on the breadboard setup.
The ZHL-6A amplifier was used with an input of 600 mVpp .
The photodiode was setup to output a low voltage.
This shows experiments on the breadboard setup with and
without the oscilloscope probe. The ZHL-1A amplifier was
used with an input of 1.2 Vpp . The photodiode was
setup to output a low voltage.
This compares experiments on the breadboard setup without
the oscilloscope probe against experiments using various
capacitors. The ZHL-1A amplifier was used with an input of
1.2 Vpp . The photodiode was setup to output a low voltage.
This shows experiments on the breadboard setup comparing
measurements taken on pins PE3 and PB5. The ZHL-1A amplifier
was used with an input of 1.2 Vpp . The photodiode was
setup to output a low voltage.
This shows experiments on the breadboard setup comparing
measurements taken with long and short connectors.
The ZHL-1A amplifier was used with an input of
1.2 Vpp . The photodiode was setup to output a low
voltage.
This shows experiments on the breadboard setup comparing
measurements taken with one set of power leads. The ZHL-1A
amplifier was used with an input of 1.2 Vpp . The
photodiode was setup to output a low voltage.
This shows experiments on the breadboard setup comparing
measurements taken with two sets of power leads. The ZHL-1A
amplifier was used with an input of 1.2 Vpp . The
photodiode was setup to output a low voltage.

4.9

4.10

4.11

4.14

4.15

4.16

4.17
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Table 4.2: Continuation of the Graphs in ATTACKING ANALOG TO DIGITAL CONVERTERS (ADC’S) including a brief description and figure number.
Description
Figure Number
This shows the initial experiments on the PCB setup.
The ZHL-1A amplifier was used with an input of
1.2 Vpp . The photodiode was setup to output a
low voltage.
This shows the experiments on the PCB setup. The ZHL-1A
amplifier was used with an input of 5.6 Vpp . The
photodiode was setup to output a low voltage.
This compares experiments on the PCB setup using different
sample times. The ZHL-1A amplifier was used with an input
of 5.6 Vpp . The photodiode was setup to output a low
voltage.
This shows the individual values read on the PCB setup at an
attack frequency of 40 MHz. The ZHL-1A amplifier was used
with an input of 5.6 Vpp . The photodiode was setup to
output a low voltage.
This shows experiments on the breadboard setup comparing
measurements taken with the antenna coil pointing forward.
The ZHL-1A amplifier was used with an input of 1.2 Vpp .
The photodiode was setup to output a low voltage.
This shows experiments on the breadboard setup comparing
measurements taken with the antenna coil pointing backward.
The ZHL-1A amplifier was used with an input of 1.2 Vpp .
The photodiode was setup to output a low voltage.
This shows experiments on the breadboard setup. Both
orientations of the antenna coil were used. The ZHL-1A
amplifier was used with an input of 1.2 Vpp .
The photodiode was setup to output a high voltage.
This shows the results of frequency experiments on
the PCB setup. This frequency sweep attempted to test
the resonant frequency of the PCB setup. The ZHL-1A
amplifier was used with an input of 1.2 Vpp . The
photodiode was setup to output a low voltage.

4.18

4.19

4.20

4.21

4.22

4.23

4.24

4.26
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CHAPTER 5
ATTACKING GPIO PINS AND DIGITAL LOGIC
This section details the setups and results for both the attacker and victim circuits
when the victim used GPIO pins to communicate digital logic between two Tiva C microcontrollers. To test the success of these attacks, the percentage of times that a GPIO pin
reported the wrong value was measured. Changing the logic level of a GPIO pin is much
harder than changing the average value reported by the ADC, since much larger voltages
must be induced. In previous experiments, voltages large enough to force an unsteady logical level were only measured on the breadboard setup. Therefore, any lack of success with
these experiments may be attributed to insufficient power. In this case, additional testing
with better antennas and higher power will be necessary to determine any potential threat
of IEMI attacks against digital logic which would be beyond the scope of this research. To
the knowledge of the author, this is the first attempt at using low power IEMI to change
digital logic.

5.1

Initial Setup
This section describes the individual setups that were used in the system. The setup

of the victim and then the setup of the attacker will be described.

5.1.1

Victim Setup

The victim circuit had two parts to it: first, the physical circuit and second, the code
running on the microcontrollers. For this work, two Tiva C microcontrollers were used [21].
A picture of the setup is shown in Figure 5.1. For the circuit, two GPIO pins were connected
directly using male to female header cables. The GPIO pin that was configured as an input
was also configured to have a weak pull-up resistor. This setup was tested with and without
a common ground.
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Fig. 5.1: Picture of the victim circuit for testing GPIO attacks.
The code that was on the microcontroller served two purposes: to take regular measurements of a digital output and to provide an interface for data output. To take regular
measurements of a digital output the microcontroller was initialized to use a GPIO pin and
timer to take readings. The timer was periodic and threw an interrupt when it expired
which triggered a read of the GPIO pin. The interface for data output was created using a
serial connection between a laptop and the microcontroller. Through this connection, the
user had a text interface that allowed the user to enter information about the surrounding
environment and then start a set of measurements. After a set of measurements was taken,
the total number of logical 1’s and 0’s measured were output over the serial connection.

5.1.2

Attacker Setup

The attacker circuit primarily consisted of the physical circuit and the equipment connected to it that controlled the input to the circuit. All inputs into the attacker circuit
were selected by hand because of the complexity of automation. A picture of the attacker
circuit is shown in Figure 5.2 and a circuit diagram of the attacker circuit is shown in
Figure 5.3. The attack circuit was set up on a breadboard. This was largely done because
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Fig. 5.2: Picture of the attacker cir- Fig. 5.3: Schematic of the attacker
circuit setup.
cuit.
of the choice of antenna. The antenna was modeled as L1 in the circuit diagram and was
made by creating a coil of wire from approximately 25 ft (7.6 m) of 22 gauge mag-wire
and a plastic spool. The gauge of wire was selected for its ability to handle the current.
The antenna was created in this way to maximize inductance and therefore maximize the
inductive coupling that was occurring between the attacker and victim circuits. As noted
earlier, this was believed to be the most efficient method of conducting this type of attack.
A high power potentiometer was used for R1 so that it was easy to experiment with different
values. The RFamp was broadband to allow for experiments over a range of frequencies and
provided enough power to make the experiment possible. Over the course of this research,
two different RF amplifiers (ZHL-6A+ and ZHL-1A) were used. The ZHL-6A+ provided
22 dBm power output and the ZHL-1A provided 28 dBm power output according to the
data sheets [22, 23]. The ZHL-1A amplifier was acquired later and was used exclusively in
latter experiments because of the increased power. Two different input sources were used as
an input source to the RF amplifiers: first, an AFG Tektronix 3252 dual channel arbitrary
function generator and second, a Hewlett Packard ESG-3000a signal generator. The AFG
3252 was used for most low-frequency experiments because it was readily available and capable of providing a sine wave input from 0 - 240 MHz [24]. The ESG-3000a was used for all
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high-frequency experiments and to verify the results of many low-frequency experiments.
It was able to provide a sine wave output from 250 kHz - 3 GHz [25].

5.2

Experimental Results
The first set of experiments that were done used the victim circuit without the common

ground. The victim was placed 5 cm in front of the attack circuit and frequency sweeps
were done with a 19 dBm input to the RF amplifier. These experiments were repeated with
high and low outputs from the second microcontroller. The results are shown in Figures 5.4
and 5.5. The highest percentage of misreads in these experiments was about 35%, which
occurred when the logical output being measured was zero. This likely had something to
do with logic levels. For similar experiments attacking the ADC, no voltage over 1 V was
ever observed. Assuming that a similar amount of voltage was being coupled to the GPIO
circuit, a true bit flip could not be accomplished; however, this amount of voltage would
likely put the logic level into an undetermined state. This is a possible explanation for why
no more than 35% of the bits ever flipped.
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Fig. 5.4: GPIO misreads of PB5 measuring PB1 outputting a logical 0.
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As can also be seen in Figures 5.4 and 5.5, the frequency at which each configuration
responded is different despite the only differences in the setup being the logical output. This
indicates that the circuit seen by the attacker changes as the logic level changes. Also of
note, is that no bits were ever flipped above 200MHz. There are likely many contributing
factors to this phenomenon; one may be poor transmission power by the antenna at these
frequencies. Another contributing factor is explained by A. Boyer et al. [16], who showed
that the power required to change the logical value of an I/O pin using a direct power
injection attack increases with the frequency of the attacking sine wave. This was verified
for the Tiva C microcontroller during this research, see Section 3.2 for details.
As can be seen in Figure 5.4, although separate frequency sweeps were done, only
two affected the digital output of the microcontroller. Additional experimentation into
what happened with this third measurement revealed that the setup was sensitive to its
environment, particularly, the position of the USB cables connecting the microcontroller
to the computer. Sometimes, the presence of a person or sheet of metal next to the setup
could increase the number of misread values. Additionally, placing shielding between the
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Fig. 5.5: GPIO misread of PB5 measuring PB1 outputting a logical 1.
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microcontroller and the computer it was connected to decreased the number of misread
values, strongly indicating that the cables had something to do with the effects that were
observed. Several different cable configurations were experimented with, including twisting
the cables around each other and putting as much distance between them as possible.
Neither of these experiments produced meaningfully different results. It was also observed
that taking quickly repeated measurements seemed to affect the results, indicating that
there was a capacitive effect involved. These experiments were later repeated using the
second setup, which had a common ground. This caused all the effects previously observed
to go away, indicating that it was likely that the IEMI attack was influencing the ground
potentials on both microcontrollers and thereby influencing the digital logic.

5.3

Summary of Experiments
No new information is presented in this section. Table 5.1 summarizes the experiments

that were done to obtain the graphs that are presented in this chapter and the reference for
the graph.

Table 5.1: Table of figures in ATTACKING GPIO PINS AND DIGITAL LOGIC including
a brief description and figure number.
Description
Figure Number
GPIO misreads reading a logic 0 no common ground
GPIO misreads reading a logic 1 no common ground
GPIO misreads reading digital logic with common ground

5.4
5.5
No Figures Provided
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Understanding the capabilities and important factors of IEMI attacks is an important
step to increase the security of modern electrical systems. The prevalence of sensors in electrical systems continues to grow because of the benefits they provide. This trend creates
more potential victims to IEMI attacks. The consequences of these attacks are varied, but
potentially life-threatening. For the safety and security of society, understanding the potential effects of IEMI attacks and their boundaries is important. Although some research has
been done in this area, much more needs to be done to provide an adequate understanding
and develop robust defenses against potential threats.
This research attempts to increase the understanding of IEMI attacks by determining
how, why, and if a relatively low power, low-frequency IEMI attack could be used to attack
higher power sensors and digital logic. To the knowledge of the author, while low power
IEMI attacks have successfully been used to attack low power sensors [5], EM sensors
[13], and a sensor network node [14], no research has attempted to attack digital logic
or extensively explored the use of low-frequency IEMI attacks. To identify how an IEMI
attack could be used, a simplistic circuit model was examined and several relevant topics
of electromagnetics were discussed. To accomplish the rest of these goals, low-frequency
IEMI attacks were conducted on higher power sensors and digital logic as part of victim
setups. As part of determining why a victim circuit may be susceptible to an IEMI attack,
this research identified key elements about the circuit under attack that may make it more
susceptible. This understanding could be used by an attacker to identify vulnerable circuits
or by a defender to minimize their vulnerability to an IEMI attack. The question of whether
IEMI attacks can effectively be used follows directly out of the results of the experiments
that were done after the effects of power and antennas were accounted for.
To begin this research, the theory of conducting IEMI attacks was investigated. This
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led to the formulation of a simple circuit model for the victim circuit and basic ideas for
its operation. This formulation revealed the existence of two types of basic attacks: nonresonant coupling and resonant coupling. Non-resonant attacks took place at any frequency
where energy was effectively transmitted to the victim circuit without resonating inside that
circuit. Resonant attacks happened at the frequency that the transmitted wave resonated
within the victim circuit, thus increasing the efficiency of the attack. This model also revealed the possibility that the resonant frequency of a circuit could be below 1 GHz. This
depended heavily on the amount of parasitic capacitance and inductance in a circuit. Unfortunately, because of the difficulty of measuring parasitic elements, this made determining
the resonant frequency directly through circuit analysis nearly impossible. Another factor
that made determining the resonant frequency difficult was that the desired field range for
the attack was in the near field. This made the resonant frequency of the victim circuit
dependent at least partially on the attack circuit, since the electromagnetic coupling would
change each circuit’s impedance. Further research needs to be done on these effects.
The design of the victim circuit and code was done using the data sheets for the
SFH 235 FA photodiode and the Tiva C microcontrollers. The code and circuit were then
tested for basic functionality without the presence of IEMI attacks. The attack circuit was
designed around the chosen antenna. In order to maximize the inductance in the attack
circuit and the size of the H field that the antenna produced, a coil antenna was used.
The amount of current through the antenna was maximized using an RF amplifier to allow
for a broad spectrum of attack. These two circuits were then placed 5 cm away from
each other and frequency sweeps of the IEMI attack frequency were done, measuring the
average output of the ADC amplifier in the victim circuit over a serial connection. An
accurate understanding of the environmental factors was obtained by comparing the results
of experiments examining a single environmental element at a time. Then the effects of
various elements in the victim circuit were determined using the same method.
From the results of these experiments, some answers to the original questions can be
answered. A summary of the results that were obtained using the PCB setup can be seen
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in Table 6.1, which summarizes attacks against a victim using an ADC, and Table 6.2,
which summarizes attacks against the GPIO pins on a victim circuit. Only these results are
summarized since they most closely resemble what an actual victim circuit would be. These
results show that the environment and setup of the victim circuit plays a vital role in the
effectiveness of IEMI attacks. Considering the worst-case scenario, an IEMI attack against
a system on a PCB using a sensor with similar power to the ones used in this research, more
power is required for the attack to be effective. However, the amount of power required to
make the attack effective would still likely be reasonable and significantly less than other
similar IEMI attacks [5, 7–9]. The other concern for the effectiveness of these attacks is the
minimum effective distance of the attack. This research does little to answer this particular
question, since all of the experiments were 5 cm or less. However, from the theory of IEMI
attacks, it is clear that increasing the distance will probably increase the required power at
an exponential rate.
The requirements for an IEMI attack on a victim circuit that is not a worst-case scenario
would still likely require more power than these experiments used to be effective. Though
the power increase required for these could be as much as 50% less than what would be
required for the worst-case scenario. To be this susceptible, a victim would only need to
use connectors or wires that were 20 cm long to connect to the sensor. Wires this length
can be seen in some electrical systems and very few systems don’t use any wires at all,
as considered in the worst-case scenario. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that low
power IEMI attacks are a potential security flaw in a number of security or safety critical
applications, though further research needs to be done to better understand these potential

Table 6.1: Summary of experimental results attacking an ADC using the PCB setup.
Direction Frequency
Success
L->H
L->H
L->H
H->L
H->L
H->L

65
65
70
65
75
30

MHz
MHz
MHz
MHz
MHz
MHz

145.7 mV
139.2 mV
145.1 mV
-97.6 mV
-227 mV
-111 mV
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Table 6.2: Summary of experimental results attacking digital logic.
Direction Frequency Success
1->0
1->0
1->0
0->1
0->1
0->1

65 MHz
110 MHz
65 MHz
105 MHz
105 MHz
0 MHz

21%
28%
20%
37%
27%
0%

flaws.
To gain a better understanding of this issue, several things need to be investigated
in further detail. This experiment should be verified on commodity hardware. Will the
IEMI attack influence every part of the circuit simultaneously, or will different parts of a
circuit be susceptible to different frequencies? Another question that needs to be answered
is: what are the current EMC standards that most commodity hardware must meet, and
will these standards affect the system’s susceptibility to IEMI attacks? Yet another topic
of IEMI attacks that requires investigation is the relationship between power, distance,
and the antenna used for the attack. How much will different antennas affect the power
requirements for an IEMI attack and the distance that power is effective at, and will more
directed antennas increase the distance by better focusing the energy used for the attack?
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